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Abstract
We study the role of rmscredit histories in a business cycle model. Loans are
dynamic contracts between banks and rms, and credit terminations are used as
an incentive device. Banks deny future loans to an entrepreneur according to his
credit histories in order to a¤ect his choice of project ex ante. This will generate
uctuations from technology shocks to the riskiness of di¤erent types of projects as
occurred during the technology bubbles. The model is used to explain the boom-
and-bust of the dot-com bubble, one leading example of technology bubbles in the
economy, in the late 1990s.
The author would like to thank David Frankel, Bhattacharya Joydeep, and Cheng Wang for helpful
comments.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study the dynamic interaction between nancial intermediaries (banks
henceforth) and rms, in particular the role of rmscredit histories, in a business cycle
model. In our model, banks deny future loans to an entrepreneur (credit termination) in
some states according to his credit history in order to a¤ect his choice of project en ante.
This will generate uctuations in an economy not only from shocks to the mean output
(productivity), but also from technology shocks to the variance of the output (riskiness).
We argue that the model can explain several of the stylized facts surrounding the
investment mania in internet technologies, namely the dot-com bubble, in the late 1990s.
The dot-com bubble should be considered as one leading example of technology bubbles in
the economy. Economists have not paid enough attention to technology bubbles. Based
on the e¢ cient markets hypothesis, even psychological biases lead to trade irrationally,
the prices of the stocks need not be irrational since the rational traders can arbitrage
by short selling (Fama, 1965). However, the doctrine is violated from time to time in
practice. The stock market performance during the dot-com bubble era, covering roughly
from 1998 to 2001, is one of the most recent and biggest in terms of scope examples.
Figure I compares the NASDAQ Composite index and the S&P 500 index from 1995
to 2005. Normalizing the initial data to 100, we can see the signicant deviation, peaked
in the early 2000, during the bubble era. During that period, the whole stock market
itself was in an uptrend as the S&P 500 index shows. However, the stocks of dot-com
companies in the NASDAQ were growing even faster. The dot-com booming lasted more
than two years and made people believe that it was a new economy paradigm. But,
compared to the non-internet sectors, there was nothing unusual in the internet sector
that could explain the dot-com booming. It turned out to be a technology bubble.1
[Figure I here]
Why didnt the market correct the illusion of the investors? Existing literature focused
on the limits of arbitrage in the market (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, among others).
Ofek and Richardson (2003) nd that substantial short sales restrictions a¤ected dot-com
stocks, e.g., the higher short interest, the higher borrowing costs. They also suggest there
was heterogeneity across investors based on low level of institutional holdings in dot-com
stocks. Prices could move substantially because optimistic and pessimistic investors
might have very di¤erent beliefs on the stock prices. Moreover, rational arbitrageurs
might ride the bubbles as the stock prices continue to grow and generate high returns
(Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2003). In Abreu and Brunnermeiers model, the prices are
bid up above their fundamental values by irrationally exuberant behavioral traders.
As rational arbitrageurs are informed sequentially, bubbles can persist for a period of
time. Selling pressure bursts the bubble when a su¢ cient mass of arbitrageurs has sold
out of stocks. Following this logic, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) study the behaviors
1An interesting rm level example further supports the irrationality of the stock market is the misprice
of Palm-3Com discussed in Lamont and Thaler (2003). Share price ratios are self-sustainable in a short
period in their case.
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of institutions (hedge funds) in the dot-com bubble. They nd: rst, the hedge funds
were heavily invested in dot-com stocks instead of correcting the stock prices during the
bubble. Second, hedge funds captured the upturn, and avoided much of the downturn by
reducing their positions in stocks which were about to decline. Therefore, they support
the argument that sophisticated investors were riding the technology bubble.
Previous literature limits to model the behaviors of investors in the stock market. And
it is hard to explain why suddenly so many investors were enthusiastic about the internet
sector. During that period, entrepreneurs entered the dot-com industry eagerly because
they believed the information technologies contribute to organizational complements such
as new business processes, new skills, and new organizational and industry structures
Investors were convinced that technological innovations would improve productivity not
just alter the preference. For example, David (1990) suggests that the spread of electricity
provide an analogy to the internet technology.
So we o¤er a di¤erent story of the dot-com bubble. Tying the investors with the
entrepreneurs, we put the story in a more general nancial intermediation model. Banks
are special in the sense that bank loans review private information about the borrowers
(James, 1987). The stock market reacts to the signals (bank loans) about where to allo-
cate the real resources in the economy. However, in our model, banks misunderstand the
new technology due to information asymmetry. The misunderstanding of the investment
opportunity leads to the bubble because the stock market believes banks have some good
news about the new technology. The crash follows when banks observe a high default
rate and tight the credit to the entrepreneurs.
Our model has two notable features. Firstly, in traditional business cycle models,
shocks a¤ect mean output of project. But we, in order to mimic the technological
innovations, introduce a specic technology shock which brings a new type of project.
Entrepreneurs prefer to invest in the new one due to the cutting-edge nature of the
project. However, the project may not be protable. Secondly, a bank could a¤ect
the entrepreneurs investment choice by cutting o¤ the credit and restricting the ow of
funds when the company has a bad performance. Credit termination could turn the
entrepreneurs attention back to the protability of the projects, but it also has some
costs, e.g., the economic activities are reduced sharply.
More precisely, we assume the set of feasible investment projects changes before and
after a technological innovation. Initially, each entrepreneur can invest in one of two
projects: a good project with a high expected output and a bad project with a low
expected output. As a standard assumption in a moral hazard model, the entrepreneur
needs to pay an additional cost if he chooses the good project. Then technological
innovation gives rise to a third type of project, which has the same mean output as the
bad project but a higher variance. For example, before an innovation, suppose that each
entrepreneur has two investment opportunities, either to produce food or to produce a
movie. Food production, the goodproject, has a high expected output, while movie-
production, the badproject, has a low expected output. Food production is a boring
investment to an entrepreneur, so an incentive is needed in order to entice him to invest
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in this project instead of movie-production. After a technology shock, each entrepreneur
has a new, even more glamorous option: to invest in a dot-com. This project has the
same mean output as movie-production (the bad project), but is even riskier. Therefore,
it is even more di¢ cult to motivate an entrepreneur to invest in food production.
And in dynamic borrowing/lending relationships, banks, which cannot directly observe
an entrepreneurs project choice, have two methods, each associated with a di¤erent cost,
to motivate the project choice: (i) by giving a (limited liability) rent to the entrepreneur;
or (ii) by cutting o¤ the credit with some probability when the entrepreneur defaults.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) pointed out banks often deny future loans to defaulters rather
than raising the interest rate that a defaulter would have to pay. We study contingency
contracts in which bad outcomes may lead to an end of the borrowing/lending relation-
ships. Credit is terminated with some probability or entirely when, due to low output in
the past, the entrepreneurs continuation payo¤ is close to a threshold in which the bank
can no longer motivate him to choose a good project in the future. The credit termina-
tion probability rises continuously from zero to one with the optimal rate determined by
minimizing the costs to induce the entrepreneurs choice of project.
In the context of this model, we study the e¤ect of the technology shock. The
shock could worsen the entrepreneurs incentive problem. Since the shock is mean-
preserving, if there are no nancial frictions, there should be no uctuations, that is, the
entrepreneur will only choose the good project. But we assume that there are nancial
frictions. Initially, receiving the funds, the entrepreneur will choose the good project,
but he is indi¤erent between the good and bad project because the good project entails
an additional cost for him, that is, his incentive compatibility constraint binds. In
response to a technological innovation, which creates a project which is even riskier and
even more appealing to the entrepreneur, the residual claimant, the bank must strengthen
the entrepreneurs incentive to choose the good project. Aggregate loans decrease due
to two reasons: rst, the bank will cut o¤ the credit. When, due to search frictions,
some of these banks fail to nd alternative borrowers after they cut o¤ the entrepreneurs
credit, there will be more ine¢ cient unemployment of resources, which is essentially what
happened at the end of the bubbles. Second, banks need to transfer rents which, due to
the zero-prot condition for the bank, entail a lower interest rate for depositors. This
causes a decline in the supply of deposits, so there are even fewer loans after the credit
termination.
The paper is structured as follows. We discuss related literature in the next section.
In Section 3, we setup the basic model. We study the dynamic loan contract and an
explicit solution for a special case with two projects and two output levels in Section 4.
We solve the equilibrium and nd the comparative static properties in Section 5.
2 Related Literature
The incentive e¤ect of termination was rst studied in a credit (or labor) market model
by Stiglitz and Weiss (1983). Spear and Wang (2005) solved for the optimal termination
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conditions in a labor contract model (the executive contracts). They show that if the
worker is risk-neutral, termination occurs when the worker is too poor to punish. On the
other hand, if the worker is risk-averse, termination may occur when the worker is too
rich to motivate. Our model results from embedding their risk-neutral case in a business
cycle setting. In addition, we reinterpret the moral hazard problem as resulting from a
choice of investment projects rather than a choice of e¤ort levels. We focus on the e¤ects
of a technological innovation which provides entrepreneurs with a risky but glamorous
new project.
In a dynamic setting, borrowing constraints have been found important in generat-
ing persistent uctuations and amplifying business cycles (Scheinkman and Weiss, 1986;
Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). There have been e¤orts at explicitly modeling borrowing
constraints and nancial intermediation in equilibrium business cycle models. For exam-
ple, Williamson (1987), and Bernanke and Gertler (1989) use a model with costly state
verication to study the e¤ects of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders
in business cycles. In Williamson, each rm has a di¤erent en ante auditing cost while
in Bernanke and Gertler, the investment cost varies from one project to another. During
a recession, ine¢ cient rms are driven out of the market. The relationship between the
rms and the intermediaries is static in those models.
However, the distribution of credit histories (or nancial capacityin Gertler [1992])
across rms is an important determinant of aggregate economic activity (Smith andWang,
2006). We introduce a dynamic loan contract model in which rms are en ante identical,
but rms face di¤erent credit restrictions based on their prior performances. Compared
to the one-period loan contract models, the dynamic loan contract model does not have to
assume heterogeneous rms en ante. Thus, we endogenize rms credit constraints in the
equilibrium path by modeling that banks will keep records of rmshistoric performances.
3 The Model Setup
Time is discrete and the horizon is innite: t = 1; 2; : : :. There is one perishable good
which can be used as a consumption or investment good in the economy. Investment
good can be used in the production of output.
The economy consists of a sequence of generations, each lives two periods. We assume
there is one old agent alive for each young agent born. With an exogenous probability
, a newborn agent becomes an entrepreneur. The rest becomes a lender. There
is no intragenerational heterogeneity within a class of agents. The number of births and
the number of deaths are equal in each period, so the total measures of entrepreneurs and
lenders in this economy are invariant.
3.1 Lenders and Entrepreneurs
A lender lives two periods, and she is endowed with h units of labor time supplied inelas-
tically in the rst period of her life, and each unit of labor time produce one unit of good.
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Lenders, who live overlapping generations, maximize their expected utility U (c1t; c2t+1),
where, for a lender born at time t, c1t is the consumption at time t when she is young, and
c2t+1 is the consumption at t+ 1 when she is old. Each unit of labor time produces one
unit of consumption good when the lenders are young. Lenders cannot produce when
they are old and do not access to any storage technology. However, they can deposit
their goods in a nancial intermediary.2
An entrepreneur lives two periods. Entrepreneurs are risk-neutral and born with zero
initial wealth. But each entrepreneur accesses to a set of projects M, and each project
produces a stochastic output , which takes value from the nite set   f1; 2g with
1 < 2, in each period of time. Given a project j 2M, the output  is distributed with
a density ij = Pr f = ij jg, and 1j + 2j = 1. Each project is carried out with two
inputs: one unit of capital (the investment good) and an entrepreneurial cost. In order
to nance his project, the entrepreneur has to borrow from a bank in the nancial market
since he has no initial wealth.
For simplicity, suppose there are two types of projects, i.e., M  f1; 2g.3 Assume
0 < 21 < 22 < 1, that is project 1 has a small probability to produce a high output
than project 2. We call project 1 a badproject and project 2 a goodproject. It is
easy to check that our model satises the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP).
Denition 1 The functions Pr f = ijjg, for j 2 M, are said to satisfy the MLRP: if
j < j0, then Prf=ijjg
Prf=ijj0g is non-increasing in i.
Normalize the entrepreneurial cost for the bad project to zero, i.e., v1 = 0; and the cost
for the good project is v2 =  > 0.
Assume the entrepreneurs period utility function H (cjj) is additively separable be-
tween the consumption and the entrepreneurial cost for any project j. Due to risk
neutrality, the utility function takes the form H (cjj) = c  vj, where c 2 R+ denotes the
entrepreneurs consumption and vj measures the entrepreneurial cost for project j. We
also assume that an entrepreneur has a reservation utility w0 = 0 in each period.
3.2 Financial Intermediation
Financial intermediaries (banks) arise as institutions of delegated monitoring (Diamond,
1984). There are a large number of risk-neutral banks which gather deposits from the
lenders and lend to the entrepreneurs. While banks cannot observe an entrepreneurs
choice of project, they observe the projects ex post outcomes.4 Since the outcome distri-
2Market is incomplete in the sense that there is no time zero "clearing house" organizes the aggregate
demand and supply for goods in di¤erent periods.
3Restrict to two types of projects and two levels of outputs will not change the results and make the
solution easy to follow.
4If an entrepreneur can repay her loan, she must repay it. The bank can observe the loan repayment
status: success or failure.
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bution depends on the project, the bank can infer the entrepreneurs behavior from the
realized outcome. Therefore, the bank species a payo¤ arrangement to the entrepreneur
conditional on the realized outcome (namely the terms of the nancial contract) in order
to motivate his choice of project. Terms of the contract will be specied in the next
section.
Our model takes as given that there are ongoing relationships between entrepreneurs
and banks. Banks lend to entrepreneurs and promises them a certain level of expected
utility. Banks can o¤er long-term or/and short-term contracts. If it uses a long-term
contract, then at the end of the rst period, the bank has a choice to continue the loan
contract or to cut o¤ the credit line and replace the entrepreneur with a new one. If it
is a short-term contract, it only lasts one period. The short-term contract is standard.
Innes (1990) proved that with the MLRP and a constraint that the payo¤ function is
non-decreasing in the outcome, the debt contract is an optimal contract in a static model.
In general, the optimal contract may not be a standard debt contract in a dynamic
relationship. However, we restrict our attention to those contracts which have a debt
contract form in each period because debt contracts are commonly observed in practice.
4 The Loan Contracts
4.1 The Short-Term Loan Contract
Denote Bi the banks payo¤ when the output is i.5 Let the banks payo¤ be non-
decreasing in the output. In each period, the payo¤ takes the standard debt contract
form: the payo¤ is Bi = i if i < R, and Bi = R if i  R, where R > 0 is the interest
rate the entrepreneur is charged. Limited liability constrains the loan contracts in two
ways: the entrepreneur cannot repay more than his output, i.e., Bi  i; and the banks
liability is limited to its investment in the rm, i.e., 0  Bi. The latter one simply makes
the entrepreneurs expected utility be bounded above so that the optimization problem
is well dened. Let ci = i  Bi be the entrepreneurs payo¤ when the output is i.
Denition 2 A short-term loan contract is: S = fBigi2f1;2g.
Let j 2M be the project suggested by the bank. If the bank promises an entrepreneur
a utility level w, its expected prot per loan from the short-term loan contract is:
Vl (w) = max
S
X
i=1;2
ijBi   r; (1)
subject to: X
i=1;2
ijci   vj = w; (2)
5Omit the time subscript without confusing in this section.
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j 2 argmax
j02M
X
i=1;2
ij0ci   vj0 ; (3)
where r is the banks cost of collecting money from the lenders (or the interest rate paid
to the lenders). The loan contract satises the promise-keeping constraint (2) and the
incentive compatibility constraint (3).
Let j denote the expected output of project j, i.e., j =
P
i=1;2 iji. Given the cost
of collecting money from the lenders, we assume it is never optimal to implement the bad
project and the good project is socially e¢ cient. That is, throughout the paper, we shall
assume:
A1. 1  r < 2    :
Assume the bank promises the rm w 2   [0; w]. Here  is the set of feasible
utilities. The promise utility w is great or equal to 0, otherwise the entrepreneur can walk
away. The upper bound w is from the limited liability of the bank. The constraints of the
incentive problem (1) lead to a threshold expected utility w such that for any promised
utility greater (less) than the threshold, the good project is (not) implementable.
Lemma 3 There is a threshold expected utility, w = 21 = (22   21), such that for any
promised utility greater than this threshold, the good project is implementable.
The optimal contract is standard. The bank wants to punish the defaulters as severe
as possible. Due to the limited liability, the entrepreneurs payo¤ ci is nonnegative for
i 2 f1; 2g. Thus, the payo¤ is c1 = 0 when the project fails. And from the promise-
keeping constraint (2), We have the following payo¤ functions when the project succeeds:
(a) if w  w, the good project is implemented and the entrepreneurs optimal payo¤ is:
c2 (w) = (w +  )=22; (b) if w < w, the good project cannot be implemented and the
optimal payo¤ is: c2 (w) = w=21. Substitute the optimal payo¤ plan into (1). The
value function of the bank conditional on lending to the entrepreneur is:
Vl(w) =

2      r   w; if w  w
1   r   w; if w < w : (4)
4.2 The Long-Term Loan Contract
Following Spear and Wang (2005), we characterize the long-term relationship between
the bank and the entrepreneur as a dynamic loan contract with termination conditions.
The bank can choose the entrepreneurs credit status k from the nite set K  fl; fg in
the second period where l is for lending and f is for cutting-o¤. The credit termination
condition is a probability that the bank cuts o¤ the credit given the realized output in
the rst period.
Denition 4 A dynamic loan contract with credit termination condition is o¤ered at the
beginning of the rst period of life time, and the terms of the contract take the following
form: L =

pi; (Bik; wik)k2K
	
i2f1;2g.
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In this denition, pi 2 [0; 1] is the probability of credit termination if the output in the
rst period was i. In addition, at the end of the rst period, according to the contract,
the rm pays Bik to the bank conditional on the credit status k when the output in the
rst period was i. The payo¤s subject to the limited liability constraints: 0  Bik  i.
Let cik = i   Bik be the entrepreneurs payo¤. Following Spear and Srivastava (1987)
and others, we use the promised utility to the entrepreneur as the state variable. At the
end of the second period, the bank will deliver a promised utility equal to wik 2  to the
rm conditional on the credit status k when the output was i in the rst period.
The following problem (5) determines the terms of the optimal contract in which the
bank promises an expected utility exactly equal to x to the entrepreneur at the beginning
of the rst period of his life time.6 If the suggested project is j, then,
max
L
X
i=1;2
ij
X
k=l;f
pik [Bik + V (wik)]  r; (5)
subject to: X
i=1;2
ij
X
k=l;f
pik (cik + wik)  vj = x; (6)
j 2 argmax
j02M
X
i=1;2
ij0
X
k=l;f
pik (cik + wik)  vj0 : (7)
Here we denote pif = pi the probability of cutting-o¤ and pil = 1   pi the probability
of lending. The contract satises the promise-keeping constraint (6) and the incentive
constraint (7). Following Stigliz and Weiss (1983), we assume that the rst period
loans have seniority over the later loans. That is, if the entrepreneur has outstanding
obligations, he must repay them before new loans from elsewhere are repaid. So when
the credit is terminated, the entrepreneur cannot renance the project due to the credit
history he had. So the expected utility to the entrepreneur is wif when the bank cuts o¤
his credit.
It is easy to see that once the promised utility w is given, the terms of contract in the
second period will not a¤ect the rst-period choice. So we can solve the contract in the
second period as a static loan contract. Following Spear and Wang (2005), let the banks
value function in the second-period be:
V (w) = max fVl (w) ; Vf (w)g ; (8)
where Vl (w) and Vf (w) are the banks value function conditional on lending and cutting-
o¤ respectively.
Explicitly, the banks value function is:
V (w) =

2      r   w; if w > w 
2      r   w
  w; if w  w : (9)
6In this simple model, an entrepreneur lives two periods. So banks and entrepreneurs take x as
exogeneously given. However, x should be interpreted as the entrepreneurs credit history in a model
where the entrepreneur could potentially live innite periods.
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If the bank lends to the entrepreneur, the second-period contract is equivalent to the
static loan contract problem (1). If the bank denies the future loan to the entrepreneur,
it will pay the promised utility w to the entrepreneur to end the relationship and look for
a replacement in the market. The expected value is:
Vf (w) = max
w0
fVl (w0) jw0  wg   w: (10)
We assume there are enough entrepreneurs who have no investment histories and are
looking for funds in the market. So the bank will nd a replacement among them
after it terminates an entrepreneurs credit. The new entrepreneur is paid w0 = w which
maximizes the banks one-period prot by (1). And thus, if the bank pays w to terminate
the credit, from (10) and the value function (4), the value function conditional on credit
termination is:
Vf (w) =
 
2      r   w
  w: (11)
It is never optimal to implement the bad project by assumption (A1),7 so we have
Vl(wjw < w) < Vf (w) and Vl(wjw  w) > Vf (w). And thus we have the banks
value function in the second period (9) by comparing (4) and (11).
Given the banks value function in the second period, we can solve the optimal long-
term contract which implements the good project in both periods. Spear and Wang
(2005) proved that when the agents promised utility is too low to support the desired
e¤ort, termination occurs as an incentive device in an executive compensation model.
The same result holds here that credit termination is a necessary punishing device if the
contract must make the entrepreneur su¢ ciently poor in the second period. The banks
optimal termination policy pi (x) in the terms of nancial contract is summarized in the
following Proposition (5).
Proposition 5 The banks optimal termination policy associated with a promise to de-
liver expected utility equal to x 2 [0; w] is: 8
p1(x) = min
(
2  x
w
+
; 1
)
, and p2(x) = 0:
So, (a) The bank will never terminate the entrepreneurs credit if he has a high output.
(b) When the entrepreneurs output is low, the bank will terminate the credit if promised
expected utility the cost of termination is not too high, i.e., x 2 [0; w]; the bank will
cut o¤ the credit with some positive probability if the termination cost is higher, i.e.,
x 2 [w; 2w]; and if it is too expensive to terminate, i.e., x 2 [2w;w], the bank will
endure the relationship. In other words, credit termination is a decreasing function of
the entrepreneurs initial promised utility x.
7This comes from the assumption that the good project is e¢ cient but the bad project is not, 2  
   r   w > 0, and 1   r < 0.
8The function X+  max fX; 0g.
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5 Shocks and Technology Bubbles
So far we have shown that the banks long-term loan contract is characterized by that rms
with bad outcome will potentially face credit cutting-o¤. In this section, we will dene
the market equilibrium when the banks are competing for both borrowers and depositors
(lenders). And then we introduce a technology shock and show that the mania stage of
a technological bubble is on the o¤-equilibrium path where banks have not adjusted loan
contracts due to information asymmetry. After more and more rms default the loan
repayment, banks will restrict the credit. That is, rms with low output are terminated
with a higher probability which is related to the crash of a technology bubble.
First, we calculate the supply of the loanable funds. In each and every period, a
young lender solves the following intertemporal utility maximization problem (12), taking
the market interest rate r as given:
U (c; c0) = max
s
u (c) + E [c0] (12)
subject to: c + s = h and c0 = rs, where 0  s  h denotes the representative lenders
savings in the rst period; c; c0  0 are consumption in each period. Let u () take the
usual concave form. Let u0 () and u00 () denotes the rst and second order derivatives
with respect to the consumption. Then u0 () > 0 and u00 () < 0. Lenders are risk-neutral
with respect to the consumption when they are old. Here E [] denotes the expectation
and the discount factor is one for simplicity. So the young lenders save and they consume
the savings when they are old. The following rst-order conditions determine a solution
under the assumption that an interior solution to the problem exists with 0 < s < h:
u0(h  s) = r: (13)
Thus we can solve the savings, s (r), as a function of interest rate from the rst order
condition.
Now, assume that banks promise y  w to a young entrepreneur who signs a short-
term contract and x to whom signs a long-term contract in his rst period of life time.
Banks choose the promised utility taking the interest rate r as given. In the second
period, only entrepreneurs who signed the short-term contract in the rst period can sign
a new contract with some other banks (include those banks looking for a replacement).
Entrepreneurs who signed the long-term contract commit to the contract. And even if
they were cut o¤ the credit, they cannot sign a new contract due to the debt seniority
assumption. The promised utility to an old entrepreneur is w, the threshold expected
utility. Assume the old entrepreneur has a cost, (1  )w with  2 [0; 1], to sign the
second period contract. In equilibrium, the young entrepreneur is indi¤erent with the
long-term and the short-term contracts, or he has the same expected utility, i.e., x =
y + w. Assume entrepreneurs take the long-term contract with probability . In the
credit market, we simply assume banks can nd a replacement after they cut o¤ the credit
of an entrepreneur without any cost. This assumption is possible if  is not too big (e.g.,
only half of the banks will issue long-term contract  < 1=2). The value of a short-term
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contract given a promised utility y is V (y). And the competition among the banks for
both borrowers and depositors will make the value equal to zero,
V (x  w) = 0: (14)
From the above zero prot condition, in the rst period, the promised utilities for the
long-term and short-term contracts are x (r) =
 
2    + w
 r and y (r) =  2     r
respectively.
Then, we calculate the demand of investment funds. In our model, in each period,
banks write a large number of loan contracts with the entrepreneurs. We can measure
the existing rms in each period by the law of large numbers. Assume that there is a
stationary distribution of the promised utility, so the measure of the rms terminated in
the second period is:
(x)  1
2
12p

1(x) (15)
=
1
2
12min
(
2    2      r
w
+
; 1
)
;
which is a weak increasing in the threshold utility w. The result comes from the denition
of p1 (x).
As we assume that once the credit line is cut o¤, no banks will nance this entre-
preneurs project again. Every entrepreneur requires one unit of capital except those
defaulted the rst period contract and were terminated in the second period. That is,
the demand for investment fund is:  (x). To close the model, the credit market clear
condition requires that the quantity of loans is equal to the quantity of deposits,
1
2
(1  ) s (r) =    (x) : (16)
Denition 6 Given fpi gi=f1;2g from the banksoptimal loan contract L, the credit mar-
ket equilibrium is fs; rg solved from equations (13), (15) and (16).
5.1 Technology Shocks
Technology shocks are introduced into the economy. A similar type of shocks with
continual support is discussed in Williamson (1987). The special feature of this type of
shocks is it will not change the productivity but the riskiness of the economy. Let St take
value from the nite set S  fa; bg and denote the state of the economy at time t. In a
normal period (St = a), the set of feasible investment projects is Ma  f1; 2g. While, in
a bubble period (St = b), due to a technological innovation, there is a new type of project
(project 1b) and the set of feasible investment projects changes, i.e., Mb 

1; 1b; 2
	
.
Here we use superscript to denote the new project. Assume the new project has the
same salvage value as the bad project (project 1), b1 = 1. The expected return on the
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new project is the same as that on the bad project, but the new project is riskier than
the bad project in the sense that if the entrepreneur chooses the former, he has a lower
chance b21 < 21 to get a higher outcome 
b
2 > 2, with the following condition holds,
(1  b21)b1 + b21b2 = (1  21)1 + 212:
Other features of the economy are identical to those specied in previous sections in
both states. The new project is mean preserving to the bad project and will not produce
uctuations in the absence of nancial frictions.9 However, with nancial frictions (moral
hazard and limited liability), it is even more di¢ cult to induce the entrepreneur to choose
the good project with the mean preserving technology shock.
Lemma 7 Entrepreneurs prefer the glamorous, new project (project 1b) than the bad
project (project 1) under the loan contract.
Mirrlees (1999) has shown if the support of distribution varies with di¤erent projects,
the rst-best can be achieved when the support is observable. Here we assume when the
output is high, the bank cannot distinguish b2 from 2. So the bank cannot infer the two
states directly. This assumption consists with our model setup because when the output
is high, debt is repaid fully and banks get the same interest rate in both states. When
the rm defaults, banks will get b1 = 1, the same salvage value before the technology
shock. However banks might infer the states by the default rate since when the rms
choose the glamorous project, the probability of low output is higher than those of the
bad project (b11 > 11) and the good project (
b
11 > 12).
5.2 Technology Bubbles
To show how aggregate variables depend on state St 2 S, we can carry out a comparative
static analysis when the economy is in a stationary equilibrium. Assume that the model
economy is in state a initially. By equations (13), (15) and (16), we can solve the
equilibrium fsa; rag. After a technology shock, the model economy changes to state b.
However, we assume that the banks cannot response to the shock immediately.
Proposition 8 If the banks cannot response immediately to a technology shock, the en-
trepreneurs will switch to the glamorous, new project (project 1b).
The result holds due to the information asymmetry. After the technology shock, the
entrepreneurs observe it and choose the glamorous, new project since it is intrinsically
appealing to them. We interpret that entrepreneurs switch to the glamorous project as
a technology bubble which is on the o¤-equilibrium path.
When the banks infer the bubble by a high proportion of defaults, they will restrict
the credit and the new equilibrium

sb; rb
	
is restored. By Proposition (8), we have
9In the model, the preference, average productivity, and population are identical in each period t.
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wb > wa since the bank need to give more incentive rents to the entrepreneur to choose
the good project in the new state. And thus we have:

 
xjwb = 1
2
12p

1
 
xjwb > (xjwa) = 1
2
12p

1 (xjwa) ;
where the superscript denotes the state. There is an ine¢ cient unemployment of resources
after the shock. The following Proposition (9) gives several predictions of the model
economy with the technology shock.
Proposition 9 With a technology shock, we predict decreases in interest rate (r) and
savings (s) after the shock is disclosed to the banks.
Intuitively, the interest rate falls because, in order to promise a higher utility to
an entrepreneur, banks must lower the cost of the funds to keep a zero prot given
entrepreneurs are ex ante identical. This is di¤erent with the prediction of traditional
credit cycle model such as Williamson (1987) where the market rate increases with a shock
and rms with high auditing costs will be driven out of the credit market. In our model,
rms are driven out of the credit market by the increase of the rate of termination. The
treasury bill rate dropped from 4.82% per year in 1998 to 3.45% per year in 2001, and
1.61% per year in 2002. The model also predicts that savings will drop which is observed
at the end of the dot-com bubble (Figure II).
[Figure II here]
5.3 Testable Hypotheses
The model connects the real and nancial sectors. We propose two pairs of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a. Financial intermediaries, which do not have full controls on the entre-
preneursinvestment behavior, lend a large amount of money to rms before they
know the information of the technology shocks.
Hypothesis 1b. Investors, even rational arbitrageurs, have no better knowledge than
the nancial institutions, and thus most of the investors are probably convinced in
a new economy paradigmobserving the credit owing into the hi-tech sector.
With the mature of internet technology, entrepreneurs were attracted by some inter-
esting business ideas such as online stores and delivery services, etc., and they looked for
funds to invest in these projects. We do not have rm level data to trace the credit
owing into those dot-com projects, but the aggregated credit ow gives us some clues
of what was going on in the economy during that period of time. Figure III records
the funds owing into the nonnancial corporate businesses (excluding farms) by the net
increase in liabilities. From 1998 to 2000, there was a large increase of the rmsnet
liabilities.
[Figure III here]
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Hypothesis 2a. Observing the inforamtion on default rate, the nancial intermediaries
re-optimize their loan contracts. Hi-tech companies are in a disadvantaged condi-
tion because the funds may dry up under disadvantage shocks, and so the value of
the rms fall.
Hypothesis 2b. The outside investors realized that the hi-tech companies are di¢ cult to
make higher prots on average, they reduce their positions in stocks, which further
lower the value of these rms.
Those projects in the dot-com bubble had razor-thin margins on average to begin with,
and few of them could attract enough customers to justify their costs. From Figure III,
there wasnt any signicant sign of a prot increasing during that period. Brynjolfsson
and Hitt (1995) nd positive relationship between the information technology investment
and productivity, but also a great deal of individual variation in rmssuccess with in-
formation technology. And much of the research on the relationship between technology
and productivity used economy-level or sector-level data and found little supporting evi-
dence (see Gordon, 2000). But the entrepreneurs still invested in the dot-com industry
because they hoped that if other companies could not sustain expending, they would take
all the shares of the market and gain large prots (Noe and Parker, 2005). Unfortunately,
defaulting increased due to a high proportion of low returns (see Table I).
[Table I here]
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we construct a business cycle model in which nancial intermediation plays
an important role. Loan contracts with termination conditions are long-term relationships
between nancial intermediaries and entrepreneurs. Due to information asymmetry,
intermediaries cannot observe entrepreneursinvestment behaviors. So credit termination
is used as an incentive device to a¤ect an entrepreneurs choice of project ex ante. This
is connected to the withdrawal of credit after the bust of the technology bubbles.
The model can be used to explain the dot-com bubble in the late 1990s which is one
leading example of the technology bubbles in the economy. From time to time, there are
beliefs that some technological innovations change the productivity, e.g., internal com-
bustion engine, electric motor, internet, or green energy, etc. Some of them did make
fundamental transformations in the economy, while others were just incremental techno-
logical changes. In the latter case, investment manias might cause ine¢ ciency because
investors could not know in advance and they were eager to catch up the technological
wave. With the development of nancial intermediation, the technology shocks will be
amplied which leads to severe economic uctuations since complicated loan contacts are
used. Proper designs of nancial contracts or regulations are required to reduce the
ine¢ ciency.
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A Appendix
Lemma 3. Proof. Consider the second period contract fBig for an entrepreneur which
implements a good project, j = 2, so the promise-keeping (2) and incentive (3) constraints
become:
(1  22) c1 + 22c2    = w;
(1  22) c1 + 22c2     (1  21) c1 + 21c2:
The incentive constraint requires that c2 c1   = (22   21). From the promise-keeping
constraint, we have
w = (1  22) c1 + 22c2    
= c1 + 22 (c2   c1)   
 c1 + 22 
22   21    
= c1 +
21 
22   21 :
Given the limited liability of the entrepreneur, we have c1  0. So the threshold expected
utility w to implement the good project is: w = 21 = (22   21).
The following Lemma (10) and Proposition (5) are from Spear and Wang (2005).
To solve the optimal long-term loan contract which implements the good project, the
promise-keeping and incentive constraints must hold:X
i=1;2
i2
X
k=l;f
pik (cik + wik)   = x; (A.1)
X
i=1;2
i2
X
k=l;f
pik (cik + wik)   
X
i=1;2
i1
X
k=l;f
pik (cik + wik) ; (A.2)
where pif = pi, and pil = 1 pi. It is straightforward to establish two preliminary results:
(i) B1k = 1, and c

1k = 0, for k 2 fl; fg; (ii) wif = 0, for i 2 f1; 2g. The rst result is
due to debt contract form with limited liability. The bank maximizes the surplus from
the contract and provides the entrepreneur with incentives. Also, it is optimal to set the
promised utility to zero if the credit is cut o¤. We need to prove the following Lemma
for the Proposition.
Lemma 10 For i 2 f1; 2g, if pi > 0, then it must hold that wil = w; if wil > w, then it
must hold that pi = 0.
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Proof. Notice that the optimization problem (5) implies
max
L
X
i=1;2
ij
X
k=l;f
pik [Bik + V (wik)]  r
() max
L
X
i=1;2
ij f(1  pi) [Bil + V (wil)] + pi [Bif + V (w)]g   r
() max
L
X
i=1;2
ij fBi + [(1  pi)V (wil) + piV (w)]g   r
() max
L
X
i=1;2
ij fBi + (1  pi) [V (wil)  V (w)] + V (w)g   r:
But this is equivalent to the following problem (A.3):
max
fpi;wilg
(1  pi) [V (wil)  V (w)] (A.3)
subject to:
pi 2 [0; 1] and wil  w, for i 2 f1; 2g:
Therefore, if pi > 0, it must be the case that V (w

il) = V (w), or w

il = w. If w

il > w,
then V (wil)  V (w) > 0, so pil = 1.
Proposition 5. Proof. We rst prove the second part of the Proposition. Suppose
p2 (x) > 0, then w

2l = w by the previous lemma. Then the entrepreneur is indi¤erent
with the two projects. However, for any " > 0, if the bank sets w2l = w + ", then the
entrepreneur will prefer the good project and the bank can make more surplus. It is a
contradiction that p2 (x) > 0 solve the optimization problem.
Then we prove the rst part of the Proposition. Similar to the previous argument,
if p1 (x) > 0, then we have w

1l = w by the previous lemma. Notice given the expected
utility x, the promise-keeping constraint (A.1) could be written as:
12 (1  p1)w + 22 (c2l + w2l) = x+  : (A.4)
Dene ew   = (22   21), the incentive constraint (A.2) must be binding to solve this
problem, which could be written as:
(c2l + w

2l)  (1  p1)w = ew: (A.5)
Solve these two equations (A.4) and (A.5) jointly, we get:
p1 = 1 
x+    22 ew
w
= 2  x
w
:
And p1 2 [0; 1], so the banks optimal termination policy comes directly.
Lemma 7. Proof. Let us only consider the old entrepreneurs. Assume the interest
rate for a loan is R, so the expected return is b21(
b
2 R). Given the contract, so we can
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only compare project 1 and project 1b. Notice the banks expected return decreases if
the entrepreneur chooses project 1b,
(1  b21)1 + b21R  r < (1  21)1 + 21R  r;
since b21 < 21. Therefore the entrepreneurs expected return increases
b21(
b
2  R) > 21(2  R);
since project 1b and project 1 have the same expected return. The entrepreneur is
indi¤erent between project 1 and project 2, and thus he will choose project 1b over project
2.
Proposition 9. Proof. First, if w   2      r = (2  ) orw   2      r = (1  ),
then (x) equals 0 or 12=2 respectively. In these two scenarios, there is no change
in the rate of credit termination. We rule out these two scenarios and only consider the
the more interesting case where
 
2      r

= (2  ) < w <  2      r = (1  ).
Then, total di¤erentiating equilibrium condition (13) and (16), we get
u00 (h  s) ds+ dr = 0;
(1  )w2ds+ 12wdr =  12
 
2      r

dw:
That is 
u00 (h  s) 1
(1  )w2 12w
 ds
dw
dr
dw
!
=

0
 12
 
2      r
  :
And use the Cramers rule, we have
ds
dw
=
12
 
2      r

det (A)
< 0;
dr
dw
=
 u00 (h  s) 12
 
2      r

det (A)
< 0;
since u00 () < 0 and also
det (A) = det

u00 (h  s) 1
(1  )w2 12w

= u00 (h  s) 12w   (1  )w2 < 0:
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Table I Moodys Default Counts
Issuer counts and dollar calue in North American. Data Source: Moodys Global
Credit Policy.
Year Issuer Counts Dollar Value
(Millions)
1995 26 4; 816
1996 16 5; 270
1997 21 5; 129
1998 45 11; 597
1999 78 31; 887
2000 116 52; 929
2001 146 114; 284
2002 99 152; 930
2003 62 38; 286
2004 34 13; 587
2005 30 40; 015
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Figure I Peaks and Valleys of Stock Price Indexes, S&P and Nasdaq composite.
Comparison of the S&P index and the Nasdaq composite index for the period from
1/1995 to 12/2005. Both indexes are scaled to be 100 on Jan. 1995. Data Source: Yahoo!
Finance.
22
Figure II Saving Rate.
The householdssaving rate from 1995 to 2005.Data Source: DEA.
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Figure III Credit Flow and Prot
The Net Liabilities and the Net Prots for the period from Q1-1995 to Q4-2005. Data
Source: Flow of Funds.
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